Référence

Guillaume Vuillemey (HEC Paris), « The Failure of a Clearinghouse: Empirical Evidence », Fédération des Banques Françaises Seminar, TSE, 4 décembre 2017, 12h30–14h00, salle MF 323.

Résumé

We provide the first detailed empirical analysis of the failure of a derivatives clearinghouse: the Caisse de Liquidation, which defaulted in Paris in 1974. Using archival data, we find three main causes of the failure: (i) a weak pool of investors, (ii) the inability to contain the growth of a large member position, and (iii) risk-shifting decisions by the clearinghouse. Risk-shifting incentives aligned the clearinghouse’s interests with those of the defaulting member, induced delays in the liquidation of the defaulted position, and led private renegotiation attempts to fail. Our results have implications for current policy debates on the design and resolution of clearing institutions.

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