Reference

Rahmi Ilkilic (Maastricht University), “Cournot Competition on a Network of Markets and Firms”, Environmental Economics Seminar, Toulouse: TSE, November 8, 2010, 11:00–12:30, room MH203.

Abstract

Suppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure. We continue to study the effects of a merger between two firms and analyze the behavior of a cartel including all the firms in the network.