Reference

Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 393, December 2008.

JEL codes

  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • L24: Contracting Out • Joint Ventures • Technology Licensing
  • Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
  • K32: Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
  • L51: Economics of Regulation

Replaced by

Pierre Dubois, and Tomislav Vukina, “Optimal Incentives under Moral Hazard and Heterogeneous Agents: Evidence from Production Contracts Data”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 4, July 2009, pp. 489–552.