Reference

Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari, and Pierre Pestieau, Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor, IDEI Working Paper, n. 591, November 2009.

Abstract

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian social welfare function, the low-ability types too face a more than 100% tax on bequests.

Keywords

Accidental bequests; estate tax; tagging; first best; second best;

JEL codes

  • H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation