Référence

Daniel Paravisini (London School of Economics), « The Information and Agency Effects of Scores: Randomized Evidence from Credit Committees », Fédération des Banques Françaises Seminar, TSE, 24 septembre 2012, 12h30–14h00, salle MF323.

Résumé

Information technologies may affect productivity by reducing agents' information processing costs, and by making agents' actions easier to evaluate by the principal. We distinguish these mechanisms empirically in the context of the randomized adoption of credit scoring in a bank that lends primarily to small businesses. We find that the effort and output of credit committees increases when applications contain a score. Output also increases in a treatment where the committee has no new in- formation, but the score will become available in the future. This effect is uniquely consistent with an agency mechanism, and explains over 75% of the total output increase. Additional evidence suggests that the pure information effect of scores, negligible on average, operates through upwards and downwards adjustments in the intensive margin of lending.

Partenaire de recherche