Document de travail
Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements
Julien Beccherle et Jean Tirole
IDEI Working Paper
n° 628, décembre 2010
Référence
Julien Beccherle et Jean Tirole, « Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements », IDEI Working Paper, n° 628, décembre 2010.
Résumé
The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as iswell-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players’ attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A “brinkmanship”, an “effort rebalancing”, and a “raising rival’s cost” effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to a variety of policy instruments, from the issuance of forward or bankable permits to standards and green investment policies.
Mots-clés
International negotiations; climate change; cap and trade; bankable permits; standards;
Codes JEL
- D62: Externalities
- F51: International Conflicts • Negotiations • Sanctions
- H23: Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q52: Pollution Control Adoption Costs • Distributional Effects • Employment Effects