Document de travail
Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan
IDEI Working Paper
n° 793, août 2013
Référence
Bruno Jullien et Alessandro Pavan, « Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information », IDEI Working Paper, n° 793, août 2013.
Résumé
We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.
Mots-clés
two-sided markets; dispersed information; platform competition; global-games; informative advertising;
Codes JEL
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design