Document de travail
Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process
David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou et Wilfried Sand-Zantman
IDEI Working Paper
n° 567, juin 2009
Référence
David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, « Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process », IDEI Working Paper, n° 567, juin 2009.
Résumé
We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but in different ways according to the strength of intellectual property rights (IPR). For example, with intermediate IPR, only pooling contracts arise with a limited amount of information revealed.
Remplacé par
David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, « Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process », Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, Paris : Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, vol. 101, 2011, p. 287–306.