
Article
The value of switching costs
Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer, and Gergely Dobos
vol. 148, n. 3, May 2013, pp. 935–952
Reference
Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer, and Gergely Dobos, “The value of switching costs”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148, n. 3, May 2013, pp. 935–952.
Abstract
We study a dynamic model with an incumbent monopolist and entry in every subsequent period. We first show that if all consumers have the same switching cost, then the intertemporal profits of the incumbent are the same as if there was only one period. We then study the consequences of heterogeneity of switching costs. We prove that even low switching cost customers have value for the incumbent: when there are more of them its profits increase as their presence hinders entrants who find it more costly to attract high switching cost customers.
Keywords
Switching cost; Dynamic competition; Incumbency; Entry;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Research partnership
Orange
Replaces
Gary Biglaiser, Jacques Crémer, and Gergely Dobos, “The value of switching costs”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 596, February 3, 2010, revised October 30, 2012.