IDEI Researcher
Member of the Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Contacts

Secretary

Links

Long CV (PDF file, 84 Kb)

Research Interest

Theory of Incentives and Applications

Professional experiences

Current positions

Former positions

Education

Grants and awards

Work in progress

Articles in working paper series

• "International Trade with Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach", IDEI Working Paper, n. 223, September 2009, revised January 2010.

  (with Thierry Verdier)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 282 Kb) ]

• "Contracting and Ideas Disclosure in the Innovation Process", IDEI Working Paper, n. 567, June 2009.

  (with Jean-Christophe Poudou and Wilfried Sand-Zantman)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 213 Kb) ]

• "Empirical Evidence on Satisfaction with Privatization in Latin America: Welfare Effects and Beliefs", IDEI Working Paper, n. 566, March 2009.

  (with Céline Bonnet, Pierre Dubois and Stéphane Straub)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 358 Kb) ]

• "The Organization of Delegated Expertise", IDEI Working Paper, n. 284, May 2004.

  (with Denis Gromb)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 294 Kb) ]

Mimeos

• Optimal Domestic Regulation under Asymmetric Information and International Trade: A Simple General Equilibrium Approach, May 2010.

  (with Thierry Verdier)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 311 Kb) ]

• Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games, April 2010.

  (with Lars Stole)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 319 Kb) ]

• How Much Discretion for Risk Regulators?, October 2009.

  (with Yolande Hiriart)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 360 Kb) ]
• "When Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?": New Insights from Asymmetric Information when Supply Chains Compete, October 2009, revised July 2010.

  (with Jakub Kastl and Salvatore Piccolo)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 240 Kb) ]

• Optimal Delegation with Multi-Dimensional Decisions, September 2009, revised June 2010.

  (with Frédéric Koessler)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 245 Kb) ]

• Weak Enforcement of Environmental Policies: A Tale of Limited Commitment and Limited Fines, 2009, revised March 2010.

  (with Yolande Hiriart and Jérôme Pouyet)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 197 Kb) ]
• The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex Ante and Ex Post Monitors, 2009, revised June 2010.

  (with Yolande Hiriart and Jérôme Pouyet)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 262 Kb) ]

• Mechanism Design with Bilateral Contracting, November 2008, revised December 2009.

  (with Vianney Dequiedt)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 427 Kb) ]

• Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy, August 2008, revised October 2009.

  (with Jakub Kastl and Salvatore Piccolo)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 235 Kb) ]

• The Cost of Contract Renegotiation in French Urban Transport Systems, July 9, 2008.

  (with Philippe Gagnepain and Marc Ivaldi)

• The Simple Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnerships, June 2008.

  (with Elisabetta Iossa)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 350 Kb) ]

Forthcoming

Contributions to books

• "The Theory of Incentives Applied to PPPs in the Transport Sector", in The Handbook of Transportation Economics, E. Quinet (eds.), 2009.

  (with Elisabetta Iossa)

  [Forthcoming]

Publications

Articles in refereed journals

• "Common Agency and Public Good Provision under Asymmetric Information", Theoretical Economics, vol. 5, n. 2, May 2010, p. 159-213.

  (with Humberto Moreira)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 409 Kb) | Abstract ]
• "Contracting for an Innovation under Bilateral Asymmetric Information", The Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58, n. 2, May 2010, p. 324-348. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00421.x.

  (with Jean-Christophe Poudou and Wilfried Sand-Zantman)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 337 Kb) ]

• "The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts", American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 2, n. 1, February 2010, p. 204-229. doi:10.1257/mic.2.1.204.

  (with Salvatore Piccolo)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 244 Kb) ]

• "Infrastructure Privatization and Changes in Corruption Patterns: The Roots of Public Discontent", Journal of Development Economics, vol. 90, n. 1, September 2009, p. 69-84. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.08.002.

  (with Stéphane Straub)

• "Renégociation de contrats dans l'industrie du transport urbain", Revue Économique, vol. 60, n. 4, July 2009.

  (with Philippe Gagnepain and Marc Ivaldi)

• "Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 144, n. 2, March 2009, p. 604-634.

  (with Lars Stole)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 284 Kb) ]

• "Market Participation under Delegated and Intrinsic Common Agency Games", The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009.

  (with Lars Stole)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 560 Kb) ]

• "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, n. 7, July 2008, p. 1541-1563.

  (with Aggey Semenov)

• "Partenariats public-privé: quelques réflexions", Revue Économique, vol. 59, n. 3, May 2008, p. 437-450.

  (with Elisabetta Iossa and Jérôme Pouyet)

• "Ideological Uncertainty and Lobbying Competition", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92, n. 3-4, April 2008, p. 456-481.

  (with Aggey Semenov)

• "To Build or not to Build: Normative and Positive Theories of Public–Private Partnerships", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, n. 2, March 2008, p. 393-411.

  (with Jérôme Pouyet)

• "The Regulator and the Judge : The Optimal Mix in the Control of Environmental Risk", Revue d'Économie Politique, 2008.

  (with Yolande Hiriart and Jérôme Pouyet)

• "The Pluralistic View of Politics: Asymmetric Lobbyists, Ideological Uncertainty and Political Entry", Economics Letters, vol. 97, n. 2, Elsevier, November 2007, p. 155-161.

  (with Aggey Semenov)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "Monitoring a Common Agent: Implications for Financial Contracting", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 135, n. 1, July 2007, p. 35-67.

  (with Fahad Khalil and Bruno M. Parigi)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "Resale Price Maintenance under Asymmetric Information", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 25, n. 2, April 2007, p. 315-339.

  (with Salvatore Piccolo)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]
• "Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 5, n. 2, April 2007, p. 614-623.

  (with Aggey Semenov)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "Collusion and the Organization of Delegated Expertise", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 137, n. 1, 2007, p. 271-299.

  (with Denis Gromb)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "Signaling and the Design of Delegated Management Contracts for Public Utilities", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, n. 4, December 2006, p. 763-782.

  (with Wilfried Sand-Zantman)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 243 Kb) ]

• "The Benefits of Extended Liability", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 37, n. 2, October 2006, p. 562-582.

  (with Yolande Hiriart)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization", Journal of Regulatory Economics, vol. 30, n. 1, July 2006, p. 5-44.

• "Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers", Economics Letters, vol. 93, n. 2, Elsevier, 2006, p. 182-189.

  (with Aggey Semenov)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 139 Kb) ]

• "Jean-Jacques Laffont et la théorie des incitations de groupes", Revue d'Économie Politique, n. 3, Hommage à Jean-Jacques Laffont, May-June 2005, p. 349-371.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud)
• "In Memoriam Jean-Jacques Laffont", Revue d'Économie Politique, n. 3, Hommage à Jean-Jacques Laffont, May-June 2005, p. 265-268.

• "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision", Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 19, n. 2, April 2005, p. 149-180.

  (with Philippe De Donder and Étienne de Villemeur)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 202 Kb) | Abstract ]

• "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries", Journal of Public Economics, vol. 89, n. 2-3, February 2005, p. 159-196.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ ScienceDirect© (PDF file) ]

• "The Agency Cost of Internal Collusion and Schumpeterian Growth", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 71, n. 4, December 2004, p. 1119-1141.

  (with Thierry Verdier)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "Delegated Monitoring versus Arm's-Length Contracting", International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 22, n. 7, September 2004, p. 951-981.

  (with Vianney Dequiedt)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "On the Optimal Use of Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Liability", Economics Letters, vol. 84, n. 2, Elsevier, August 2004, p. 231-235.

  (with Yolande Hiriart and Jérôme Pouyet)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "The Benefits of Central Bank's Political Independence", European Economic Review, vol. 48, n. 2, Elsevier, April 2004, p. 353-378.

  (with Emmanuelle Gabillon)

  [ Full text (PDF file) ]

• "From Inside the Growth Process", Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 1, n. 2-3, April-May 2003.

  (with Thierry Verdier)

• "Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70, n. 2, 2003, p. 253-280.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Abstract ]
• "Regulatory Inertia", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 34, n. 3, Fall 2003, p. 413-438.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud)
• "Contractual Externalities in Common Agency Games", Advances in Theoretical Economics, vol. 3, n. 1, 2003.

  (with Lars Stole)

• "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency", Econometrica, vol. 70, n. 4, July 2002, p. 1659-1673.

  (with Lars Stole)

  [ Jstor© ]

• "Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion", Contributions to Theoretical Economics, vol. 2, n. 1, 2002.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ ScienceDirect© ]

• "Optimal Taxation and Strategic Budget Deficit Under Political Regime Switching", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 68, n. 3, July 2001, p. 573-593.

  [ Jstor© ]

• "On Some Agency Costs of Intermediated Contracting", Economics Letters, n. 71, Elsevier, 2001, p. 75-81.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud)

• "Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment", Econometrica, vol. 68, n. 4, July 2000, p. 799-837.

  (with Bruno Biais and Jean-Charles Rochet)

  [ Jstor© ]

• "A Theory of Supervision with Endogenous Transaction Costs", Annals of Economics and Finance, vol. 1, Peking University Press, May 2000, p. 231-263.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ ScienceDirect© ]

• "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation", Econometrica, vol. 68, n. 2, March 2000, p. 309-342.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Jstor© ]

• "The Endogenous Transaction Costs of Delegated Auditing", European Economic Review, vol. 43, n. 4-6, Elsevier, April 1999, p. 1039-1048.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud and Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ ScienceDirect© ]

• "The Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods", Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 1, n. 4, 1999, p. 399-438.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Abstract ]
• "Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 30, n. 2, Summer 1999, p. 232-262.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Jstor© ]
• "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators", Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 88, n. 2, 1999, p. 261-294.
• "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies : Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 66, 1999, p. 929-948.

  [ Jstor© ]

• "Transaction Costs, Institution Design and the Separation of Powers", European Economic Review, vol. 42, Elsevier, 1998, p. 673-684.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ ScienceDirect© ]
• "Collusion and Delegation", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 29, n. 2, 1998, p. 280-305.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Jstor© ]

• "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information", Econometrica, vol. 65, n. 4, July 1997, p. 875-911.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Jstor© ]

• "A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior", The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 99, n. 4, 1997, p. 555-579.
• "Strategic Trade Policy for Uninformed Policy Makers", Journal of International Economics, vol. 42, 1997, p. 33-65.

  (with Lael S. Brainard)
• "The Firm as a Multicontract Organization", Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, vol. 6, n. 2, 1997, p. 201-234.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

  [ Abstract ]

• "Strategic Trade Policy Design with Asymmetric Information and Public Contracts", Review of Economic Studies, vol. 63, n. 1, 1996, p. 81-105.

  (with Lael S. Brainard)

  [ Jstor© ]
• "Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory", The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 27, n. 1, 1996, p. 1-31.

  [ Jstor© ]
• "The Multiprincipal Nature of the Government", European Economic Review, vol. 40, Elsevier, 1996, p. 673-685.

• "Competition under Nonlinear Pricing", Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n. 34, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, April-June 1994, p. 71-114.

  (with Marc Ivaldi)

  [ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]

• "La Nouvelle Micro-Economie et l'Analyse du Secteur Agro-Alimentaire : Quelques Développements Récents", Cahiers d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales, n. 32, INRA, Paris, 1994, p. 41-71.

  (with Michel Moreaux)

• "Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection", Annales d'Économie et de Statistique, n. 28, Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris, October-December 1992, p. 1-38.

  [ Article ©Journal (PDF file) ]

Articles in proceedings

• "Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design", Advances in Economic Theory, Blundell, Newey and Persson (eds.), series Proceedings of the World Congress of the Econometric Society, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Books

• The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model, Princeton University Press, 2001. ISBN:978-0-691-09184-6.

  (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)

Contributions to books

• "Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator", in The Political Economy of Antitrust, Vivek Ghosal and Johan Stennek (eds.), n. 285, March 2007, p. 383-416.

  (with Antoine Faure-Grimaud)

• "Recent Developments on Regulation and Liability", in Frontiers in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability, Marcel Boyer, Yolande Hiriart et David Martimort (eds.), series Ashgate Studies in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Ashgate, 2006, p. 1-16.

  (with Marcel Boyer and Yolande Hiriart)
• "Contract Theory", in The New Palgrave, K. Arrow, L. Blume and S. Durlauf (eds.), 2006.

  [ Full text (PDF file, 86 Kb) ]
• "Environmental Risk Regulation and Liability under Adverse Selection", in Frontiers in the Economics of Environmental Regulation and Liability, Marcel Boyer, Yolande Hiriart et David Martimort (eds.), series Ashgate Studies in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, Ashgate, 2006, p. 209-233.

  (with Yolande Hiriart)

Contributions to manuals

• "Les crises de régulation: une approche méthodologique", Série Droit et Economie de la Régulation, M.-A. Frison-Roche (eds.), Presses de Sciences Po et Dalloz, 2005.

  (with T. Cazenave and Jérôme Pouyet)

IDEI Reports

• Une réflexion économique sur les thèmes de la gestion déléguée et des partenariats publics-privés, n. 14, IDEI, Toulouse, February 2009.

  (with Daniel Coublucq)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 2 Mb) ]
• The Theory of Incentives Applied to the Transport Sector, n. 13, IDEI, Toulouse, February 2009.

  (with Elisabetta Iossa)

  [ Full text (PDF file, 240 Kb) ]

Articles in the Press

• "Théorie des mécanismes et principe de révélation", Les Echos, October 23, 2007.

  [ Full text ]