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### POSITIONS

- 2008 – ...      Assistant Professor, University of Toulouse I  
Research fellow at TSE-GREMAQ, CNRS and University of Toulouse 1
- 2007 – 2008    Visiting Scholar, Department of Economics at the University of  
Pennsylvania  
(Lavoisier Fellowship from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- 2006 – 2007    Post-doctoral Fellow, University of Orléans.
- 2005 – 2006    Research Fellow, University of Paris X
- 2003 – 2005    Teaching assistant – University de Paris X
- 2000 – 2003    Assistant research fellow - University of Paris X

### EDUCATION

- 2007      PHD in Economics at the University of Paris X
- Defended on 07/04/07 with the highest distinction.
- Title of the thesis: "Theoretical contributions to the analysis of economic magnitudes - Market game, Arbitrage, Law of one price and social learning"*
- Advisor: André Orléan*
- Committee: Rabah Amir (referee), Francis Bloch (referee), Jean Cartelier (President), André Orléan, Andrew Postlewaite.*
- 1999 – 2000    Master "Economie des institutions" - University Paris X - EHESS –  
Ecole Polytechnique - (With Highest Honors)
- 1997 – 2000    High Level University Degree in Applied modelling - jointly Bachelor  
and Master degrees in econometrics - University Paris X (With Highest  
Honours).

### RESEARCH INTERESTS

Economic theory, Applied Economic Theory, Game Theory, Social learning, Strategic Market Games.

## WORKING PAPERS

*Money, Equilibrium and Trade*, joint with Régis Breton, July 2007, (in progress, last version, September 2008).

We analyse the conditions for existence of an equilibrium featuring trade in strategic market games and highlight the role played by the monetary structure of trade as a way of modifying the terms of competitions which might favour trade in equilibrium.

*Market liquidity and the law of one price*, March 2005 (revised version, 2008).

We show that, for the existence of equilibria featuring price dispersion in market games with multiple trading-posts, that competition is imperfect is not sufficient and highlight the role played by the levels of liquidity of the markets.

*Walras allocations with imperfect competition and market segmentation*, April 2008.

We consider the effect of market segmentation in an general equilibrium model with imperfect competition and provide strategic foundations for Walrasian allocations when markets are segmented.

*Robustness of equilibrium price dispersion in finite market games*, joint with Régis Breton, 2006 – revised 2007 (under revision for the *Journal of Economic Theory*).

We propose an approach to selecting equilibrium allocations in strategic market games based on the idea that they should be robust to the introduction of arbitrarily small transactions costs. It is shown that, in market games with multiple trading-posts, equilibrium price dispersion is not a robust property and the set of robust equilibrium allocations does not depend on the market structure.

*How large should you be in a market? Understanding price dispersion when trade are costless and fragmented*, June 2005 (revised version, December 2007).

We investigate the analysis of Cournot market games with trade fragmentation and qualify the role played by liquidity constraints in the existence of unprofitable arbitrage opportunities and equilibrium price dispersion. It is distinguished between barter and monetary economics and convergence to the law of one price when the number of agents grows is stated in the presence of liquidity constraints.

*Robust and Non-robust equilibria in a strategic market game*, July 2007, joint with Régis Breton.

We illustrate an approach of restricting the set of equilibria in a strategic market game, based on the idea that equilibria should be robust to arbitrarily small transactions costs. Existence and Unicity of robust equilibrium allocations with trade are discussed.

## WORKING PROGRESS

*On wash-sales and the difference between allocative and Nash equivalence in market games*, August 2005.

*Social learning with lack of information*, 2005.

## **WORKING PAPERS AND WORKING PROGRESS (IN FRENCH)**

*(In-)efficient social learning when information is incomplete*, 2004, (revised 2006)

*Between efficient and slow social learning*, February 2002 (revised May 2006).

*From Walras to Grossman-Stiglitz*, march 2003 (revised May 2006).

*Imperfect competition and Robustness of equilibrium in market games*, 2006, (Joint with Régis Breton).

*Arbitrage and the law of one price in market games*, in French, September 2005.

*Social learning with incomplete observation and partial information*, in French, 2005.

## **CONFERENCES, SEMINARS**

Congress of the French Association of Economics (2008, 2006, 2005)

External Lunch Seminar, University of Cergy-Pontoise (2008)

Exchange Workshop in Economic Theory - University Paris X (2007)

Symposium on Banking and Monetary Economics (2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003)

International conference on game theory, SUNY – Stony Brook (2006, 2005)

WG Competition - EconomiX - University Paris X (2006)

WG Theoretical Economics, Lunch Seminar - PSE (2006)

External Seminar of LEO (2006)

Lunch Séminar - EconomiX (2005)

SeMInI - FORUM - University Paris X (2005, 2003, 2002)

Workshop "International Financial crises" (2004)

First Workshop "Regards Croisés" - "Mieux comprendre la valorisation des titres sur les places financières: Regards croisés en sciences sociales" (2004)

15<sup>th</sup> Annual meeting on Socio-Economics (2003)

8<sup>th</sup> Annual Workshop on Economics with heterogeneous interacting agents (2003)

5<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the association of heterodox economics (2003)

4<sup>th</sup> Workshop «Money and Markets» (2003)

SeMInI - FORUM - University Paris X (2003)

Third Workshop «Microfoundations of Money»- GDR «Monetary and Financial Economics » (2002)

Summer School "Cognitive Economics" (2001)

## TEACHING EXPERIENCES

### *Current:*

Microeconomics, License 2

Microeconomics, License 3

### *Teaching assistant:*

Microeconomics and Macroeconomics, License 1

Introduction to economic analysis, License 1

Macroeconomics (License 2)

## REFERENCES

### **Rabah AMIR**

Professor of Economics, Eller College of management

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<http://econ.arizona.edu/faculty/Amir.aspx>

### **Francis BLOCH**

Professor of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique & Warwick University

Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique

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*Homepage:* <http://www.vcharite.univ-mrs.fr/PP/bloch/introduction.htm>

### **Françoise FORGES**

Professor of Economics, Université Dauphine

CEREMADE

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<http://www.dauphine.fr/edocif/Forges/Francoise.Forges.htm>

### **André ORLEAN (Advisor)**

Director of Research at CNRS and EHESS

Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques

*Email:* andre.orlean "at" ens.fr

<http://www.pse.ens.fr/orlean/>

### **Andrew POSTLEWAITE**

Harry P. Kamen Professor of Economics, Professor of Finance, University of Pennsylvania

Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania

*Email:* apostlew "at" econ.sas.upenn.edu

*Homepage:* <http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~apostlew>

## MISCELLANEOUS

Co-organiser of the Exchange Seminar (University of Paris X)

Organizer of the Exchange Workshop in Economic Theory (University of Paris X)

Member of the EconomiX council (2005 – 2007)

Translation of "Labour market conventions and legal evolution", Simon Deakin, for Editions *La Découverte*.