

Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications

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Discussion
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- Contribution
 - Solve for competition in multi-part tariffs in LRT with
 - Non-reciprocal termination rates
 - Asymmetry between networks
 - Apply to unilateral setting of termination rates
- Revival of the issue of TR
 - Substitution fixe-mobile
 - Convergence *F2M*
 - Broadband (*VoIP*) and *F2F competition*

- Model: variation on different transport costs
 - Two networks: incumbent I and new E
 - Off-net and on-net prices at perceived costs

$$U^I = v - X^E \cdot \Delta v(a_E) - G^I + \eta tx$$

$$U^E = v - X^I \cdot \Delta v(a_I) - G^E + t(1 - x)$$

$$\Pi^I = X^I G^I + X^I (1 - X^I) \pi(a^I)$$

$$\Pi^E = X^E G^E + X^E (1 - X^E) \pi(a^I)$$

- Four dimensions in choosing TR
 - Direct Impact on termination revenue
 - Indirect impact on demand
 - Increase in demand cross-elasticity
 - Strategic effect due to termination revenue
- Increasing the advantage of incumbent
 - reduces demand elasticity
 - increases its eq.market share but only to $2/3$ in the base Hotelling model (due to price effects)
- Hard to get intuitions from the paper

- The strategic effect due to termination revenue is asymmetric because this revenue is maximal with equal size.
- Higher access revenue:
 - Makes incumbent softer competitor
 - Makes entrant tougher competitor
- The entrant has thus a lower propensity to raise TR
 - For small differences, the incumbent set higher TR
- When large advantage to incumbent,
 - The incumbent residual demand elasticity goes to zero: TR at monopoly price
 - Strategic effect dominates for entrant : TR below monopoly rate (to soften competition)

Comments

- Existence and stability for small differentiation
- No tipping / no predation
- Entrant has less profit but is it worth-off compared to
 - Cost based regulation?
 - Reciprocal TR ?
- Optimal TR?
- Receiver surplus and receiver pay
 - Reduces incentives to raise TR
- Endogeneous differentiation