

USO design in a competitive environment

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- Volumes are declining in most developed economies (–3% in France in 2011), in relation to e-substitution:
 - e-mail and phone calls instead of personal letters
 - SMS instead of Season's greetings
 - on-line bill and commercial documents
 - on-line newspapers
 - more on-line advertisement, less direct mail

Question 1: What is the market under consideration?

Are you considering the customer as a receiver or a sender?

- Nowadays, the sender market for residential customers is limited (16% of mail volumes in France)
- If considering the receiver situation, then the fact that the receiver is not the one (directly) paying for the service should be taken into account in a model of competition

The model

Competition between 2 vertically differentiated firms

Firm 1 is representing a postal operator. Firm 2 is supposed to be the Internet

- Vertical differentiation (à la Mussa-Rosen), quality $x_1 < x_2$
- 2 regions: urban (low cost) and rural (high cost)
- Technology 1: Cost is quadratic in quality plus a fixed cost f
- Technology 2: Fixed cost F in rural area. F is sufficiently large so that the coverage of rural area is never profitable

Question 2: What is *quality* in the model?

Is it **frequency** of delivery or **transit time**?

The hypotheses

The hypotheses about the USO

Ubiquity The service is offered in both regions

Affordability Prices and quality should be set so as to ensure full coverage $U(\theta) \geq 0$: **an interesting suggestion as to what is affordable**

Uniform quality Same quality in both regions

No uniform price Price discrimination between the 2 areas is allowed. **This seems at odd with what we observe in practice**: uniform price for single piece item is a universal service requirement in France. Even in telecoms, operators are often choosing to differentiate quality between regions but keeping the same price

Sustainable Firm 1 should be profitable $\pi_1 \geq 0$

The results

The propositions in the paper

Postal only (benchmark situation) Welfare maximization calls for a higher quality than profit maximization

Postal and alternative technology The postal firm prefers a lower quality than in the benchmark case. The welfare maximizing quality is also lower than in the benchmark case. The sustainability constraint might be binding

Shared financing A universal service fund including both firms allow to relax the sustainability constraint. It is welfare improving, **as long as taxes are non-distortionary**: when is it the case?

Ubiquity constraint on the technology 2 Costly in any case because of the fixed cost F

Thank you!