CONFERENCES
IN TRIBUTE TO
JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT

TOULOUSE – FRANCE
June 30 - July 1-2, 2005

Programme
## Thursday, June 30
(Université Toulouse I - Sciences Sociales, Arsenal)

### WELCOME ADDRESS
Amphi A – 8:45 – 9:00

**Bruno Sire**, Vice-Président, Université Toulouse I – Sciences Sociales

### PLENARY LECTURE
Amphi A - 9:00 – 10:00

Chair: **Elhanan Helpman**, Harvard University Cambridge

*Multicontracting Mechanism Design: Towards a Theory of Transaction Costs*

**David Martimort**, University of Toulouse (IDEI) and Institut Universitaire de France

10:00 – 10:30  Coffee Break in Mainlobby

### PARALLEL SESSIONS 10:30 - 12:00

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<td><strong>Robert Gary-Bobo</strong>, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne</td>
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<td><em>Political Competition when Parties Represent Constituents. An Application to Environmental Policy</em></td>
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<td><strong>Philippe De Donder</strong>, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)</td>
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<td>H. Cremer and F. Gahvari</td>
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<td><em>Critical Decisions and Constitutional Rules</em></td>
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<td><strong>Bernard Belloz</strong>, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)</td>
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<td><em>Essential and Weak Single-Peakness</em></td>
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<td>S. Barbræra</td>
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<td><em>Information Transmission in the Absence of Commitment</em></td>
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<td><strong>Carlos Maravall Rodriguez</strong>, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid</td>
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<td><em>Information, Polarization and Accountability in Democracy</em></td>
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<td><strong>Christian Schultz</strong>, University of Copenhagen</td>
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<td><strong>Christian Bontemps</strong>, LEEA et GREMAQ, University of Toulouse</td>
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<td><em>Finite and large sample distribution-free inference in linear median regressions under heteroskedasticity and non linear dependence of unknown form</em></td>
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<td><em>Testing Distributional Assumptions: A GMM Approach</em></td>
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<td><em>Spectral method for deconvolving a density</em></td>
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<td><em>Sequential Vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions</em></td>
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<td><strong>Guido Friebel</strong>, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)</td>
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<td><em>Competition between Public and Private Universities: Quality, Prices and Exams</em></td>
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<td><strong>Laura Romero</strong>, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, E. del Rey</td>
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<td><em>Efficient Tuition &amp; Fees, Examinations, and Subsidies</em></td>
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PS7 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1
Room 163 Bis
Chair: Catherine Casamatta, Université de Toulouse (CRG)
- Firm Size and the Quality of Entrepreneurs
  Hans K. Hvide, Norwegian School of Economics and Business, and CEPR
- Shareholder Access to Manager-Biased Courts and the Monitoring/Litigation Tradeoff
  Sergei Stepanov, ULB, ECARES
- Globalization and the Empowerment of Talent
  Dalia Marin, University of Munich
  T. Verdier

PS8 – THE DETERMINANTS OF PREFERENCES
Room 234
Chair: Michel Lebretón, Université de Toulouse (GREMAQ -IDEI)
- The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization
  Isabelle Brocas, USC and CEPR
  J. D. Carillo
- The Welfare Economics of Adaptive Preferences
  C. Christian von Weizsäcker, University of Cologne
  A Consumption CAPM with a Reference Level
  René Garcia, CIREQ, CIRANO and Université de Montréal
  E. Renault and A. Semenov

PS9 – LABOUR ECONOMICS
Room 242
Chair: Javier Ortega, Université de Toulouse (GREMAQ)
- Money, Fame and the Allocation of Talent: Brain Drain, the Matthew Effect and the Institution of Science
  Dob-Shin Jeon, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CREA
  D. Menicucci
- Estimation of Causal Effects on Wage Inequality Using IV Methods and Sample Selection Models
  Stacey H. Chen, SUNY at Albany
  S. Khan
- A Model of Mixed Signals with Applications to Countersignaling and The Ged?
  Humberto Moreira, Getulio Vargas Foundation
  A. Araujo and D. Gottlieb

PS10 – REGULATION THEORY
Room 326
Chair: François Ortalo-Magné, University of Wisconsin
- Government Outsourcing: Contracting with Natural Monopoly
  Pierre Marie Picard, University of Manchester and University of Louvain
  E. Auriol
- Regulating a Multiutility Firm with Scope Economies: All that Glitters is not Gold
  Giacomo Calzolari, Università di Bologna
  C. Scarpa
- Endogenous Price Mechanisms, Capture and Accountability Rules: Theory and Evidence
  Carmine Guerriero, London School of Economics

PS11 – LAW AND ECONOMICS
Room 112
Chair: Patrick Rey, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)
- Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts
  W. Bentley MacLeod, Columbia University and University of Southern California
- Realistic Standards. Optimal Negligence Rule under Limited Liability.
  Juan José Ganuza, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
  F. Gomez
- The Public Management of Environmental Risk: Separating Ex ante and Ex post Monitors
  Jérôme Pouyet, CREST-LEI & CERAS-ENPC
  Y. Hiriart

PS12 – PERSPECTIVES IN THE POSTAL SECTOR
Room Gabriel Marty
Chair: Bernard Roy, La Poste
- The structure of the postal network: sunk cost and contestability
  Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute,
  Liberalization and regulatory framework: The learnings from the last ten years
  Joëlle Toledano, Supelec
- Competition and the structure of prices in the postal sector
  Helmhut Cremer, Université de Toulouse, IDEI

PS13 – FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
Room 240
Chair: Fany Declerck, Université de Toulouse (CRG)
- A Historical Perspective on the Microstructure of the Bond Market
  Bruno Biais, Université de Toulouse and IDEI
  R. Green
- Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem Efficient
  Patrick Bolton, Princeton University
  A. Faure-Grimaud
- Efficient Derivative Pricing by the Extended Method of Moments
  Eric Renault, Université de Montréal
  P. Gagliardini and C. Gourieroux
### INVITED SESSIONS 13:30 - 15:30

**SESSION 1: ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION**  
Amphi E  
Chair: Jerry Hausman, MIT  

- Estimating a Semi-Parametric Duration Model without Specifying Heterogeneity  
  Jerry Hausman, MIT  
  T. Woutersen  
- Estimators for Discretely Sampled Levy Processes  
  Yacine Ait-Sahalia, Princeton University  
  J. Jacob  
- Estimation with Weak Instruments and Many Instruments  
  Whitney Newey, MIT  
  C. Hansen and J. Hausman  

**SESSION 2: ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY: MICROFOUNDATIONS AND MACRO IMPLICATIONS**  
Amphi A  
Chair: Roland Bénabou, Princeton University  

- Belief in a Just World and Redistributive Politics  
  Roland Bénabou, Princeton University  
  J. Tirole  
- A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control  
  Drew Fudenberg  
  Harvard University  
  D. Levine  
- The Neuroeconomics of Simple Choice  
  Antonio Rangel  
  Stanford University  
  D. Bernheim

**SESSION 3: OPTIMAL DESIGN OF VOTING PROCEDURES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS**  
Amphi C  
Chair: Thomas Palfrey, Princeton University  

- Efficiency, Equity, and Timing in Voting Mechanisms  
  Marco Battaglini, Princeton University  
  R. Morton and T. Palfrey  
- Minorities and Storable Votes  
  Alessandra Casella, Columbia University, EHESS, GREQAM  
  T. Palfrey and R. Riezman  
- Qualitative Voting in Conflict Resolution Situations: An Experimental analysis  
  Rafael Hortalà-Vallve, London School of Economics

### PARALLEL SESSIONS 16:00 - 17:30

**PS14 – RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT**  
Room 242  
Chair: Farid Gasmi, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)  

- Moral Hazard and the Internal Organization of Joint Research  
  Simona Fabrizi, Universidad del Pais Vasco, DFAEII  
  S. Lippert  
- The Organization of Inventive Activities in Science-Based Industries  
  Claudio Panico, University of Toulouse  
  A. Gambardella  
- How Strong are Weak Patents?  
  Carl Shapiro, University of California  
  J. Farrell  

**PS15 – COLLUSION**  
Room 112  
Chair: Carole Harithchabalet, Université des Sciences Sociales (GREMAQ)  

- Partial Communication and Collusion with Demand Uncertainty  
  Heiko Gerlach, University of Auckland  
- Corruption and Product Market Competition  
  Stéphane Straub, University of Edinburgh  
- The Impact of Leniency Programs on Cartels  
  Patrick Rey, Université de Toulouse and IDEI  

**PS16 – AUCTION 1**  
Room 124  
Chair: François Salanié, Université de Toulouse (INRA)  

- Stochastic Dynamic Programming in Space: An Application to British Columbia Forestry  
  Harry J. Paarsch, University of Iowa  
  J. Rust  
- The Effect of Corruption on Bidding Behavior in First-Price Auctions  
  Leandro Arozamena, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella  
  F. Weinschelbaum  
- Ebay 9/11  
  José Canals-Cerdá, University of Colorado  
  J. Pearcy
PS17 – DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS  
Room 244

Chair: Emmanuelle Auriol, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Intermediation by Aid Agencies
Paul Seabright, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse and CEPR
C. Rowat

The Missing Ingredient in Aid Effectiveness: The Design Effect
Waly Wane, World Bank

The Paradox of Power Reconsidered: A Theory of Political Regimes in Africa
Jean-Paul Azam, Université de Toulouse and IDEI

PS20 – ECONOMETRICS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION  
Room 163 Bis

Chair: Pierre Dubois, Université de Toulouse (INRA-IDEI)

Risk Aversion, Expected Earnings, and Opportunity Costs: A Structural Econometric Model of Human Capital Investment
Thomas Brodaty, THEMIA Université Cergy Pontoise
R. Gary-Bobo and A. Prieto

Asymmetric Information in Insurance
Bruno Jullien, Université de Toulouse (IDEI) or Bernard Salanié CREST-INSEE, GRECSTA and CEPR
F. Salanié

Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians’ Choices?
Mathilde P. Machado, University Carlos III de Madrid
R. Mora and A. Romero-Medina

PS23 – COMMUNITY, IDENTITY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL  
Room 316

Chair: Roberta Dessi, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

A Cognitive Theory of Identity
Roland Bénabou, Princeton University
J. Tirole

Globalization and the dynamics of cultural identity
Thierry Verdier, Delta
M. Thoenig and J. Olivier

Collective memory, identity and cultural investments
Roberta Dessi, Université de Toulouse and IDEI

PS24 – REGULATION AND COMPETITION  
Room 340

Chair: Thomas Mariotti, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

The Relationship between Regulation and Competition Policy for Network Utilities
David Newbery, University of Cambridge

The Impact of Regulation on Market Risk
Paul A. Grout, University of Bristol
A. Zalewska

Competing with Advertising Resources
Claude Crampes, Université de Toulouse and IDEI
C. Haritchabalet and B. Jullien

PS18 – PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1  
Room 136

Chair: Helmuth Cremer, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Optimal Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy
Félix Bierbrauer, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn and CDSEM, University of Mannheim

Optimal Policy to Influence Individual Choice Probabilities
Eytan Sheshinski, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling
Martin F. Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

PS19 – GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION  
Room 137

Chair: Etienne B. de Villemeur, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Crises an Capital Requirements in Banking
Lucy White, Harvard Business School
Alan D. Morisson

Informational and Economic Efficiency in REE with Asymmetric Information
Xavier Vives, INSEAD and ICREAD-UPF
S. Messner

Efficiently Regulated Competition in Insurance Economies with Adverse Selection
Peter J. Hammond, Stanford University

PS21 – INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1  
Room 326

Chair: Michel Moreaux, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Durable Goods Monopoly with Quality Improvements Over Time
Gary Biglaiser, University North Carolina
J.J. Anton

Shrouded Attributes and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets
Xavier Gabaix, MIT
D. Laibson

Getting a Smaller Slice... Yet Baking a Larger Pie
Joao Vieira-Montez, University of Lausanne

PS22 – BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING REGULATIONS  
Room 234

Chair: Jean-Charles Rochet, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy
Gérard Roland, University of California, CEPR and WDI
E.Berglof and E-L. von Thadden

Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The role of Seniority
Patrick Bolton, Princeton University
O. Jeanne

Debt Restructuring and Voting Rules
Philip Bond, University of Pennsylvania
H. Eraslan
PLENARY LECTURE
Amphi A - 17:30 – 18:30

Chair: Patrick Fève, University of Toulouse (IDEI)

*Risk Sharing within and between Households: New Theoretical Results and Empirical Applications*

Pierre-André Chiappori, Columbia University

WELCOME COCKTAIL
Mayor of Toulouse – 18h45

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Friday, July 1

(Centre des Congrès Pierre Baudis)

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PLENARY LECTURE
9:00 – 10:00

Chair: Marc Ivaldi, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

*The Empirical Analysis of Market Outcomes in Imperfectly Competitive Industries: An Overview of Recent Developments*

Ariel Pakes, Harvard University

10:00 – 10:25 Coffee Break
### Friday, July 1

**TOULOUSE ROUNDTABLES ON ECONOMIC POLICY**

(Centre des Congrès Pierre Baudis)

#### OPENING ADDRESS

**10:25 – 10:30**

Jean Tirole, Research Director Institut D’Économie Industrielle

#### COMPETITION POLICY AND THE DYNAMISM OF OUR ECONOMIES

**10:30 – 12:30**

Chair **Mario Monti**, President, Bocconi University  
Moderator **Patrick Lane**, Finance Editor, The Economist  
Panelists **Franklin Fisher**, Professor of Economics, MIT  
Martin Hellwig, Professor of Economics, Max Planck Institute  
Michael Katz, Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley  
John Vickers, Chairman of the Board, Office of Fair Trading

12:30 – 14:00  Lunch (Room Caravelle)

#### RISK SHARING AND THE WELFARE STATE

**14:00 – 16:00**

Chair **Philippe Douste-Blazy**, Minister of Foreign Affairs (TBC)  
Moderator **Martin Wolf**, Associate Editor, Financial Times  
Panelists  
Tony Atkinson, Professor of Economics, Warden of Nuffield College  
Peter Diamond, Professor of Economics, MIT  
Guy Laroque, Head of the Macroeconomics Laboratory, INSEE-CREST  
Jacques Drèze, Professor of Economics, University of Louvain

15:30 – 16:00  Coffee Break

#### DEVELOPMENT AND WORLD INEQUALITIES

**16:30 – 18:30**

Chair **Dominique Strauss-Kahn**, Professor of Economics, Institute of Political Studies, Paris  
Moderator **Jean-Marc Vittori**, Editorialist, Les Echos  
Panelists  
François Bourguignon, Chief Economist and Senior Vice President, World Bank  
Dani Rodrik, Professor of International Political Economy, Harvard University  
Amartya Sen, Lamont University Professor, Harvard University  
Nicholas Stern, Director, UK Treasury

#### JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT: RECOLLECTIONS

**18:35 – 19:15**

Colette Laffont,  
and  
Paul Champsaur, Jacques Crémer, Roger Guesnerie

#### OFFICIAL DINNER

Hôtel Dieu Saint-Jacques - **20:00**
**Saturday, July 2**
(Université Toulouse I - Sciences Sociales, Arsenal)

**PLENARY LECTURE**
Amphi A - 9:00 – 10:00

Chair: Christian Gollier

Why Do We Procrastinate?
Eric Maskin, Princeton University

10:00 – 10:30 Coffee Break in Mainlobby

**PARALLEL SESSIONS 10:30 - 12:00**

**PS25 – POLITICAL ECONOMY 2**
Room 112
Chair: Philippe De Donder, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Gérard Roland, University of California
T. Persson and G. Tabellini

Protectionist Bias in Majoritarian Politics
Elhanan Helpman, Harvard University
G. M. Grossman

Populism
Lars Frisell, Sveriges Riksbank

**PS26 – CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2**
Room 124
Chair: Bruno Biais, Université de Toulouse (DEI)

Optimal Debt Contracts with Non-verifiable Cash Flow and Renegotiation
Murat Usman, Koc University

Hold-up and Credit Rationing in Oligopoly
Jian Tong, University of Southampton

Asset Diversion, Input Allocation and Capital Structure
Annamaria C. Menichini, Università di Salerno and CSEF
D. Fabbri

**PS27 – DYNAMICS AND INCENTIVE THEORY**
Room 136
Chair: Nicolas Treich, Université de Toulouse (INRA)

Organizational Inertia and Dynamic Incentives
Marcel Boyer, CIRANO, CIREQ and Université de Montréal
J. Robert

Sequential Common Agency with Moral Hazard
Cécile Aubert, Université Paris Dauphine

Regulation under Imperfect Observability: The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts Revisited
T. D. Jeitschko, Michigan State University

**PS28 – PUBLIC ECONOMICS 2**
Room 137
Chair: Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, Université de Toulouse

Voting and Efficient Public Good Mechanisms, and Efficiency
John Ledyard, Caltech

Pensions with Heterogenous Individuals and Endogenous Fertility
Cremer H., Université de Toulouse and IDEI
F. Gavhari and P. Pestiau

Intergenerational risk-sharing and risk-taking of a pension fund
Christian Gollier, Université de Toulouse and IDEI

**PS29 – CONTRACT THEORY 1**
Room 163 Bis
Chair: Alban Thomas, Université de Toulouse (INRA)

Auction and the Informed Seller Problem
T. Mariotti, Université de Toulouse and IDEI
B. Jullien

Relationship Formation Under Asymmetric Information: The Role of Contractual Commitment
Luis Vasconcelos, Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-up Problem
Ferdinand von Siemens, University of Munich

**PS30 – INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2**
Room 326
Chair: Claude Crampes, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Private Label and the Specific Retailers’ Role
Fabian Bergès-Sennou, INRA and University of Toulouse
P. Rey

The Case for Econometrics in Merger Simulation: Hachette/Edits
Jérôme Foncel, Université de Lille 3
M. Ivaldi

Incentive to Encourage Downstream Competition under Bilateral Oligopoly
Stéphane Caprice, INRA-ESR Toulouse and University of Warwick
PS31 – TWO-SIDED MARKET  
Room 234

Chair: Bruno Jullien, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Platform Ownership
Konrad Stahl, V. Nocke and M. Peitz

Two-Sided Network Effects, Bank Interchange Fees, and the Allocation of Fixed Costs
Mats Bergman, Swedish Competition Authority & Södertörn University College

The Welfare Consequences of Vertical Integration in the Securities Clearing and Settlement Industry
Jean-Charles Rochet, Université de Toulouse and IDEI

PS32 – SOCIAL INTERACTION  
Room 242

Chair: André Grimaud, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Social Embeddedness and Economic Governance: A Small World Approach
Raja Kali, University of Arkansas

Informal Insurance in Social Networks
Francis Bloch, GREQAM G. Genicot and D. Ray

Social Networks as Substitutes for Markets
Gilles Saint-Paul, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

PS33 – ETHICS HETEROGENEITY IN HIDDEN INFORMATION MODELS  
Room 240

Chair: François Salanié, Université de Toulouse (INRA)

Asymmetric Information from Physician Agency: Optimal Payment and Healthcare Quantity
P. Choné, CREST LEI A. Ma

Discussant: C. Aubert

Screening when not all consumers are strategic: Does a Monopoly need to Exclude?
Sergei Severinov, R. Deneckere

Discussant: Doh Shin Jeon

Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Care about Fairness
Ingela Alger, Boston College R. Renault

Discussant: Antoine Faure-Grimaud

PS34 – ROUNDTABLE: THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN ELECTRICITY MARKETS  
Room Gabriel Marty

Chair: J. Tirole, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

B. Lescœur, EDF

D. Newbery, University of Cambridge

P. Joskow, MIT

PS35 – REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT – PROMOTING LOCAL RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: EXPERIENCE OF CHINA, ARGENTINA, AND COTE D’IVOIRE  
Amphi E

Chair: François Bourguignon, World Bank

Regulation and Development: The Experience of Ivory Cocody
Tano Adjény Paulin, Université de Cocody

Regulatory Reforms in Infrastructure Sectors: Lessons from China?
Xinzhu Zhang, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Translating Principles into Practice: The Experience of the Economic Regulation
Martin Rodriguez Pardina, Macrocosulting, Argentina

12:00 – 13:30 Lunch – Centre de Congrès Pierre Baudis (Room Caravelle)
INVITED SESSIONS 13:30 - 15:30

SESSION 1: ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
Amphi A

Chair: Philippe Aghion, Harvard University

Contracts That Rule Out But Do Not Rule In
Oliver Hart, Harvard University
J. Moore

Contracts and the Division of Labor
Elhanan Helpman, Harvard University
D. Acemoglu and P. Antras

The Knowledge Economy
Luis Garicano, University of Chicago
E. Rossi-Hansberg

Academic Freedom, Private Sector Focus, and the Process of Innovation
Mathias Dewatripont, Université libre de Bruxelles
P. Aghion and J. Stein

Political Competition and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence from United States
Torsten Persson, IIES, Stockholm
T. Besley and D. Sturm

15:30 – 16:00 Coffee Break in Mainlobby

SESSION 2: FRONTIERS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Amphi C

Chair: Mark Rozenzweig, Harvard University

Property Rights, Political Power and Agricultural Investment in Ghana
Christopher Udry, Yale University
M. Goldstein

Agricultural Development, Industrialization and Rural Inequality
Mark Rozenzweig, Harvard University
A. Foster

Incentives and Nutrition for Rotten Kids: Intra-household food allocation in the Philippines
Ethan Ligon, Berkeley
P. Dubois

SESSION 3: ECONOMICS IN A SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT
Amphi I

Chair: Andrew Postlewaite, University of Pennsylvania

On the Dynamics of Social Interactions
Alberto Bisin, NYU
O. Ozgur

A "Super" Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games
Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University
D. Gerardi and R. Lagunoff

Why Are the Wealthy Treated So Well?
Philipp Kircher, University of Bonn
G. Mailath and A. Postlewaite

SESSION 4: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
Amphi E

Chair: Dale Jorgenson, Harvard University

Information Technology and the G7 Economies
Dale Jorgenson, Harvard University

ICT and Economic Growth in Spain 1985-2002
Matilde Mas, Universitat de Valencia & Ivie
J. Quesada

Catching-Up or Getting Stuck? Europe's Troubles to Exploit ICT's Productivity Potential
Bart van Ark, University of Groningen

PARALLEL SESSIONS 16:00 - 17:30

PS36 – AUDIT
Room 222

Chair: Martial Dupaigne, GREMAQ

Credibility of Auditors and Incentives to collude
Lucia Quesada, University of Wisconsin
E. Peyrache

Optimal Auditing Standards
Giovanni Immondino, Università di Salerno and CSEF
M. Pagano

Ownership of Ratings
Elie Peyrache, HEC School of Management, Paris
A. Faure-Grimaud and L. Quesada

PS37 – INFORMATION
Room I36

Chair: Yolande Hiriart, Université de Toulouse (IDÉI)

Rationale for Searching (Imprecise) Health Information
Francesca Barigozzi, University of Bologna
R. Levaggi

Heterogeneous Information and the Benefits of Transparency
Christian Hellwig, University of California

Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change
Alessandro Pavan, Northwestern University
G. Angeletos and C. Hellwig

PS38 – IMPERFECT COMPETITION
Room 122

Chair: David Bardet, Université de Toulouse (GREMAQ)

Entry, Costs Reduction, and Competition in the Portuguese Mobile Telephony Industry
Pedro Pereira, Autoridade da Concorrência
P. Gagnepain

Oligopolistic Competition as a Common Agency Game
Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, BETA-Theme, Université Louis Pasteur and Institut Universitaire de France
C. d’Aspremont

Bertrand, Cournot and Monopolistically Competitive Equilibria
Richard Kihlstrom, University of Minnesota
PS39 – CONTRACT THEORY 2
Room 137
Chair: Norbert Ladoux, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

1. Theory of Optimal Contract Duration with Application to Outsourcing
Matthew Ellman, UPF

Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication
Roland Strausz, Free University Berlin
H. Bester

On Screening
François Salanié, Université de Toulouse and INRA

S42 – EXCLUSIVE DEALING
Room 316
Chair: David Spector, CNRS and Fédération Paris Jourdan.

Exclusive dealing, Entry, and Mergers
Massimo Motta, European University Institute, Florence
C. Fumagalli and L. Persson

Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing
Joseph Farrell, University of California

Exclusive Contracts and Demand Foreclosure
David Spector, CNRS and Fédération Paris Jourdan

PS43 – AUTHORITY, INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES
Room 234
Chair: Wouter Dessein, University of Chicago

Organizing for synergies: Allocating Control to Manage the Coordination Incentive Trade-off.
Wouter Dessein, University of Chicago
L. Garicano and R. Gertner

Optimal Delegation
Niko Matouschek, Northwestern University
R. Alonso

Technology, Information and the Decentralization of the Firm
Philippe Aghion, Harvard University
D Acemoglu, C. Lelarge, J. van Reenen, and F. Zilibotti

PS44 – ECONOMETRICS OF SCIENCE, R & D AND INNOVATION
Room 240
Chair: Jacques Mairesse, CREST

Top Research Productivity and its Persistency: A Survival Time Analysis for a Panel of Belgian Scientists
Reinhiilde Veugelers, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
S Kelchtermans

R&D and the Patent Premium
Marco Cecchagnoli, INSEAD
A. Arora and W. Cohen

Does Innovation Stimulate Employment? A Firm-Level Analysis Using Comparable Micro Data from Four European Countries
J. Mairesse, CREST
R. Harrison, J. Jaumandreu and B. Peters

PS45 – TRADE
Room 242
Chair: Georges Molins-Ysal, Université de Toulouse (ARQADE)

Price-Channel Effects of North-South Trade on The Direction of Technological Knowledge and Wage Inequality
Alvaro Aguiar, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto
O. Alonso

Access Regulation and Cross-Border Mergers: Is International Policy Coordination Beneficial?
Trond E. Olsen, Norwegian School of Economics and BA
K. E. Lommerud and O. R. Straume

The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Market Structures
Marie-Françoise Calmette, Université de Toulouse

PS46 – AGRICULTURAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS
Room 244
Chair: Vincent Requillart, Université de Toulouse (INRA-IDEI)

Hedging Reconsidered Again
Robert Chambers, University of Maryland

Isolation and Subjective Welfare
Marcel Fafchamps, University of Oxford
F. Shilpi

Governance Structures and Multilateral Bargaining in Natural Resource Systems
Gordon Rausser, University of California
L. Simon

PS47 - COMPETITION AND REGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES
Room 112
Chair: David Newbery, University of Cambridge

Prices Fluctuations, Investment Incentives and Supply Security – The Nordic Experience
Nils-Henrik M. von der Fehr,

Incentive Regulation in Practice
Paul Joskow, MIT

Investment Incentives and Electricity Market Design: The British Experience
F. Roques,
D. Newberry and W. Nuttall

PS40 – AUCTION 2
Room 163 Bis
Chair: Jean-Pierre Florens, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

How to Buy a Differentiated Product
John Asker, Leonard N. Stern School of Business
E. Cantillon

Managing Switching Costs in Multiperiod Procurements with Strategic Buyers
Huseyin Yildirim, Duke University
T. R. Lewis

Comparisons of Alternative Payment Mechanisms for French Treasury Auctions
Erwann Sbai, The University of Auckland
O. Armantier

PS41 – EMPIRICAL TESTS ON INCENTIVE THEORY
Room 326
Chair: Thierry Magnac, Université de Toulouse (INRA-IDEI)

Does Fertility Respond to Financial Incentives?
Bernard Salanié, CREST-INSEE, GRECSTA and CEPR.
G. Laroque

Incentive Changes in a Multitasking Setting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Brown University
L. Garicano

Formal and Informal Risk Sharing in LDCs: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Pierre Dubois, Université de Toulouse and IDEI-INRA
T. Magnac and B. Jullien

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F. Roques,
D. Newberry and W. Nuttall
Chair: Jacques Crémer, Université de Toulouse (IDEI)

Robust Mechanism Design

Steve Morris, Yale University