Take or Pay Contracts and Market Segmentation

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¹ Motivation and Results

- The liberalization of the natural gas industry is a hot topic in the European policy agenda
- Focus on the security of supply and the problem of access to transport infrastructures (upstream segments)
- We want to analyze entry and competition in the downstream segments (retail) once (assuming) the access problems is solved.

Three key features of the gas industry after liberalization plans:

- Long-term import contracts with take-or-pay obligations:
 - zero marginal costs on a relevant portion of capacity
- Absence of a wholesale market:
 - retailers have to design marketing strategies and select which clients to approach
- Gas is a commodity:
 - limited scope for product differentiation at the retail level

Results:

- If the incumbent's TOP portfolio does not cover the entire demand, entry occurs;
- The incumbent and the entrant select different subsets of clients and set monopoly price (market segmentation), hence, we observe entry without competition;
- Imposing antitrust ceilings or gas release obligations to the incumbent modifies the allocation of market shares but does not promote competition in the retail segment;
- A compulsory wholesale market determines generalized entry and retail competition; the overall outcome is not worse than a decentralized market.

2 Related literature

• TOP contracts:

- Cretì and Villeneuve (2994), Crocker and Masten (1985), Weiner (1986).
- These papers focus on the reasons why TOP are adopted looking at the relationship of the producer and the importer; no analysis on the impact of TOP on downstream competition
- Market competition with capacity constraints or decreasing returns:
 - Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Davidson and Deneckere (1986), Vives (1986), Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Maggi (1996)

³ The model

- Firms: I and E
- Costs:
 - TOP obligations: \bar{q}_i
 - Unit cost of gas: \boldsymbol{w}

$$C_i(q_i, \overline{q}_i) = \begin{cases} w\overline{q}_i & \text{for } 0 \le q_i \le \overline{q}_i \\ w\overline{q}_i + w(q_i - \overline{q}_i) & \text{for } q_i \ge \overline{q}_i \end{cases}$$

- Demand:
 - Total demand D fixed
 - (limited) horizontal differentiation in commercial services (a la Hotelling)
- TOP obligations and capacities:
 - $-\bar{q}_I \leq D$ and $\bar{q}_E = D \bar{q}_I$ (later on \bar{q}_E endogenized), no absolute capacity constraint
- Entry and competition:
- – Customers are approached sequentially; once approached, the (active) firms offer a price simultaneously;
- – The incumbent has a first mover advantage in approaching any customer;
- - We can analyze entry decisions grouping customers in two submarkets: market 1 as $D_1 = \overline{q}_I$ and market 2 as $D_2 = \overline{q}_E$.

• Timing:

- $t_1: I$ and then *E* decide whether to enter or not in market 1; once entry decisions are taked, price(s) are set simultanously;
- $t_2: I$ and then *E* decide whether to enter or not in market 2; once entry decisions are taked, price(s) are set simultanously.


4 Equilibrium (sketch)

Price Competition:

- When both firms compete with low (0) or high (w) marginal costs, both obtain positive sales and profits;
- When a high marginal cost firm competes with a low marginal cost rival, the former gets no sales and profits;

Entry:

- In Market 2 a firm enters if it has residual obligations, otherwise it stays out.
- In Market 1 firm *I* enters;
- - If firm *E* enters, low margins in market 1, both firms have residual capacities and enter in market 2, again with low margins;
- – If firm *E* does not enter, firm *I* exhausts its TOP obligations and does not enter in market 2, where *E* can enter as a monopolist.



Proposition 1 When $\overline{q}^{I} < D$, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the incumbent enters in the first market, while the entrant enters in the second market. Both firms charge to their customer(s) the monopoly price $u^* - \frac{9}{16}\psi$.

Corollary 2 When $\bar{q}^I = D$, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the incumbent enters in the market and charges the monopoly price $u^* - \frac{9}{16}\psi$, while the (potential) entrant does not enter.

Proposition 3 If the entrant chooses its obligations \bar{q}_E at time 0, given the incumbent's obligations \bar{q}_I , and then the game follows as in the benchmark model, the entrant chooses obligations equal to the residual demand, i.e. $\bar{q}_E = D - \bar{q}_I$.

5 Policies

• We obtain entry without competition: no benefit for consumers from liberalization. Hence, additional policies are needed

5.1 Antitrust ceilings

• Some countries (UK, Spain, Italy) have introduced market share ceilings or gas release programs upon the incumbent to reduce its dominance and make entry easier

Proposition 4 If the incumbent cannot hold more than $\hat{q}_I < \bar{q}_I$ TOP obligations, I enters market $\hat{D}_1 = \hat{q}_I$, E enters market $\hat{D}_2 = D - \hat{q}_I$ and both set the monopoly price. Hence, antitrust ceilings shift only market shares from I to E

5.2 Wholesale market

- Consider the creation of a compulsory wholesale market where the importers, burdened with TOP obligations, sell, and the retailers buy whatever amount of gas a the wholesale price p_w (with no TOP obligation)
- The retailers now have a flat marginal cost at p_w for any amount of gas
- Entry in any submarket is always profitable (product differentiation)
- We obtain generalized entry and low margins over the wholesale price p_w : the final price is $p = p_w + \frac{\psi}{2}$
- The wholesale price p_w depends on the competitive conditions in the wholesale market: $p_w \in [w, u^* \frac{17}{16}\psi]$
- The final price, in any case, cannot be higher than the monopoly price $u^* \frac{9}{16}\psi$.

6 Conclusions

- Liberalization plans have failed, so far, to consider competition in the downstream market, focussing on the upstream market (security of supply and access to transport infrastructures)
- The combination of TOP obligations and market decentralization can create strong incentives to market segmentation, inducing entry without competition
- Antitrust ceilings or gas release programs can create room for additional entry, but do not induce competition
- A compulsory wholesale market can create generalized competition in the retail segment; competition in the wholesale market remains an issue, but the outcome cannot be worse than that of market segmentation