



Seabron Adamson

CRA International

Features of this Nash-Cournot model

- Full lossless DC representation network representation and locational marginal prices
- Endogenous forward contracting levels by firms in a twosettlement market
- Stylized representation of demand, supply and transmission uncertainty
- Forward trading at zonal hub prices calculated from weighted average of nodal prices



Advantages of the solution technique

- Solution to period 1 "spot" equilibrium where each firm solves for its own q's (recognizing that they affect hub prices used for forward contract settlement)
- Solves for nodal prices using a formulation akin to the original formulation of spot prices in Schweppe et. al. (1988)
- Solve for equilibrium problem in period 0 where each firm's individual MPEC is solved iteratively and with parametric representation of other firm's decisions



Limiting assumptions

- Risk neutral generators
- No bid demand in period 0 market perfectly elastic demand for forward contracts at expectation of weighted nodal prices
- In real electricity markets, are forward speculators risk-neutral?
- An quick example from the NYISO two-settlement market suggests they may not be or that transactions costs are important

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	
da_lmp rt_lmp			26.06277 44.74061			

(data from Jan 2002 to Oct 2006 for NYISO Zone G node)



Questions to explore

- Paper provides a computationally-elegant means of solving a very difficult problem in reasonable time
- Can be applied to actual two-settlement markets in US where there is accessible data? Can the model help explain the actual level of forward contracting in these markets?
- Do concepts developed in the iterative MPEC/EPEC solution scheme have an economic interpretation?

