Working paper
Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous
Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer
IDEI Working Paper
n. 414, September 2006
Reference
Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer, “Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firms' Objectives are Endogenous”, IDEI Working Paper, n. 414, September 2006.
JEL codes
- D21: Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D62: Externalities
- H82: Governmental Property
Replaced by
Philippe De Donder, and John E. Roemer, “Mixed Oligopoly Equilibria when Firm's Objectives are Endogenous”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 27, n. 3, May 2009, pp. 414–423.