Abstract
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream manufacturers that produce differentiated goods and downstream retailers that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, at the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Keywords
vertical relations; exclusive dealing; vertical merger; foreclosure; bilateral contracting;
JEL codes
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L42: Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity Discounts
Replaced by
Volker Nocke, and Patrick Rey, “Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 177, September 2018, pp. 183–221.
Reference
Volker Nocke, and Patrick Rey, “Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration in Interlocking Relationships”, TSE Working Paper, n. 14-515, July 2014, revised June 2018.
See also
Published in
TSE Working Paper, n. 14-515, July 2014, revised June 2018