Seminar

Preference Evolution under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

Jörgen W. Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics)

April 16, 2013, 11:00–12:30

Toulouse

Room MS 001

Economic Theory Seminar

Abstract

What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by their success in terms of resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis. At one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her material payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of material payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality - the weight placed on the moral goal - is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.

Keywords

evolutionary stability; preference evolution; moral values; incomplete information; assortative matching;