Customary Norms, Inheritance, and Human Capital: Evidence from a Reform of the Matrilineal System in Ghana

Abstract

This paper explores the effects of different descent rules on human capital accumulation. In a context where parents are constrained in the possibility of passing land on to their children (e.g., because it is considered property of the extended family, or clan), investment in their children's human capital might not be optimal. We focus on matrilineal inheritance rules and exploit a policy experiment in Ghana, the introduction of the 1985 Intestate Succession Law. The Law introduced minimum quotas for the land that fathers can devolve on their children through intestacy, substantially reducing the share going to the matriclan. In our setting, the Law allowed parents to move closer to the unconstrained optimum. We find evidence that, compared to the other patrilineal ethnic groups in Ghana (unaffected by the Law), children in matrilineal groups exposed to the reform received significantly less education. This effect is specific to males for whom the matrilineal constraint was binding, while there is no effect for females. This evidence suggests that before the reform matrilineal groups in Ghana invested more in their children's education to substitute for land inheritance and more generally that traditional norms are important in determining the intergenerational accumulation of property and human capital investments.