Seminar

From Plygyny to Serial Monogamy: A Unified Theory of Marriage Institutions

David de La Croix (Université Catholique de Louvain)

June 4, 2012, 17:00–18:30

Toulouse

Room Amphi S

Political Economy Seminar

Abstract

Consider an economy populated by males and females, both rich and poor. The society has to choose one of the following marriage institutions: polygyny, strict monogamy, and serial monogamy (divorce and remarriage). After having identified the conditions under which each of these equilibria exists, we show that a rise in the share of rich males can explain a change of regime from polygyny to monogamy. The introduction of serial monogamy follows from a further rise in either the proportion of rich males, or an increase in the proportion of rich females. Strict monogamy is a prerequisite to serial monogamy, as it promotes the upward social mobility of females more than polygyny. We also show that polygyny is compatible with democracy.

Keywords

Marriage; Polygyny; Monogamy; Divorce; Human capital; Political economy;