Article dans une série de papiers de travail :

David Martimort et Wilfried Sand-Zantman, « A Mechanism Design Approach to Climate Agreements », TSE Working Paper, n°11-251, 31 août 2011, révision 30 avril 2013.
[ Texte complet ]

Résumé

We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly limited enforcement. Taking a mechanism design perspective, we study how countries can agree on effort levels and compensations to take into account multilateral externalities. We delineate conditions for efficient agreements and trace out possible inefficiencies to the conjectures that countries hold following disagreement. We show how optimal mechanisms admit simple approximations with attractive implementation properties. Finally, we also highlight how limits on commitment strongly hinder performances of optimal mechanisms.

Codes JEL

D82 : Asymmetric and Private Information

Groupes thématiques TSE

Economie de l'environnement et ressources naturelles
Economie Théorique