Article dans une série de papiers de travail :
(TSE, ARQADE and IDEI) et Pierre M. Picard
(CREA, University of Luxembourg and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain), « A Theory of BOT Concession Contracts »
, TSE Working Paper
, n°11-228, 25 mars 2011.
In this paper, we discuss the choice for build-operate-and-transfer (BOT) concessions when governments and
rm managers do not share the same information regarding the operation characteristics of a facility. We show that larger shadow costs of public funds and larger information asymmetries entice governments to choose BOT concessions. This result stems from a trade-o¤ between the government’s shadow costs of
nancing the construction and the operation of the facility and the excessive usage price that the consumer may face during the concession period. The incentives to choose BOT concessions increase as a function of ex-ante informational asymmetries between governments and potential BOT concession holders and with the possibility of transferring the concession cost characteristics to public
rms at the termination of the concession.
Public-private-partnership, privatization, adverse selection, regulation, natural monopoly, infrastructure, facilities
L43 : Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
L51 : Economics of Regulation
D83 : Search, Learning, and Information
L33 : Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
Economie du développement