Article dans une série de papiers de travail :

Giuseppe Marco Attanasi, Luca Corazzini et Francesco Passarelli, « Voting as a Lottery », TSE Working Paper, n°09-116, mars 2010, révision novembre 2010.
[ Texte complet ]

Résumé

Voting is a lottery in which an individual who is uncertain about how the others vote wins if she belongs to the majority or loses if she falls into the minority. The risk of losing can be reduced by increasing the majority threshold. This however has the negative effect of also lowering the chance to win. We find that an individual prefers higher majority thresholds when she is more risk averse, less powerful, or less optimistic about the chance that others will vote like her. De facto, raising the majority threshold is a form of protection against the higher risk of being tyrannized by an unfavorable majority. We include these preferences for majority thresholds in a Nash bargaining game that describes constitutional negotiations over voting rules. Individuals that largely avert the risk of being tyrannized behave reluctantly during negotiations, and succeed in getting higher protection through a threshold raise.

Mots clefs

majority rule, supermajority, risk aversion

Codes JEL

D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D81 : Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
H11 : Structure and Scope of Government

Groupe de recherche TSE

Economie comportementale et expérimentale