Article dans une série de papiers de travail :

Guillaume Cheikbossian, « The Collective Action Problem: Within-Group Cooperation and Between-Group Competition in a Repeated Rent-Seeking Game », TSE Working Paper, n°09-085, 24 septembre 2009.
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Résumé

This paper analyzes the ability of group members to cooperate in rent-seeking activities in a context of between-group competition. For this purpose, we develop an infinitely repeated rent-seeking game between two groups of different size. We first investigate Nash reversion strategies to support cooperative behavior in a given group before analyzing double-edge trigger strategies which have the property that cheating on the cooperative agreement in a given group is followed by non-cooperation in this group and cooperation in the rival group. The main conclusion is that the set of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained within the larger group as a subgame perfect outcome is as large as that for which cooperation can be sustained in the smaller group. Hence, in contrast with Olson’s (1965) celebrated thesis but in accordance with many informal and formal observations, the larger group is as effective as the smaller group in furthering its interest.

Mots clefs

collective action, rent-seeking, within-group cooperation

Codes JEL

C72 : Noncooperative Games
C73 : Stochastic and Dynamic Games
D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 : Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

Groupe thématique TSE

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