Communication à un séminaire :
(Oxford University), « Wait and See: A Theory of Communication over Time »
, Economic Theory Seminar
, TSE, Toulouse, 23 mars 2010, 11:00-12:30, salle MF 323.
We study a dynamic cheap talk model with multiple senders where the receiver can choose when to make her decision and communication can take place over time. Delays are wasteful, and no player can commit to
any action or inaction; the receiver can choose momentary inaction only if her beliefs about the continuation play rationalize that. In contrast to the results in static versions of the model, we show that when the senders
commonly know the state of nature, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists with instantenous, full revelation irrespective of the size and direction of the senders’ biases. We show that the equilibrium outcome is robust to the introduction of a type of small noise in the senders’ signals about the state.
D72 : Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 : Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
D82 : Asymmetric and Private Information
D83 : Search, Learning, and Information